By Lacie Zhang, Researcher at Bitget Wallet
On August 20, 2025, a rumor that China might be considering issuing a RMB stablecoin, reported by Reuters, quickly sparked widespread speculation in global cryptocurrency and financial markets. While this was largely speculation, the fact that this topic, long considered taboo, has generated such a stir is itself a significant policy indicator. This trend is not groundless; it is the inevitable result of years of spontaneous private exploration and careful official observation. The Bitget Wallet Research Institute will explore the history and development of RMB stablecoins.
1. Testing the Edge of the “Red Line”: The Exploration Process of RMB Stablecoins
Before exploring official intentions, we must first understand a fundamental background: RMB stablecoins are not new; exploration has been ongoing in the market's "gray area" for years. Key to understanding this lies in distinguishing between two core concepts: the onshore RMB (CNY) and the offshore RMB (CNH). Simply put, the CNY is the legal tender of mainland China and is subject to strict capital controls; the CNH, on the other hand, is the RMB circulating outside of China, with a more market-based exchange rate, providing a natural environment for early exploration of stablecoins.
Based on this, the only stablecoins currently in circulation are those pegged 1:1 to the offshore RMB (CNH). Coingecko's statistics on RMB stablecoins only cover the offshore RMB (CNH). Throughout its development, we can see three different types of players, each representing three different approaches.
International giants have only briefly ventured into the field: Stablecoin giant Tether and US-based TrustToken (now Archblock) launched CNHt and TCNH in 2019 and 2022, respectively. These were more like strategic explorations of a potential market, aiming to leverage small-value cross-border payments. However, constrained by mainland China's strict regulatory framework, they didn't invest in significant promotions. Ultimately, their success was lackluster, and they gradually faded from mainstream attention. Their combined market capitalization currently stands at only a few million US dollars.
The mainland team's failure: CNHC, founded by a Chinese team, was once considered one of the most promising competitors in the sector, receiving investments from KuCoin Ventures, members of Circle's founding team, and IDG Capital. However, just as the project was gaining momentum, its Shanghai office was raided by police in May 2023, with core members detained, bringing the project to an abrupt halt. This event marked a significant milestone in mainland China's tightening regulation of crypto businesses.
A roundabout breakthrough within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative: Following the CNHC crisis, AnchorX, a Hong Kong fintech company jointly incubated by Conflux and Hony Capital, was established. Its core team reportedly has close ties to CNHC. They chose a more circuitous path—in February 2025, they were the first to obtain a license for issuing fiat stablecoins in Kazakhstan. They focus on cross-border trade settlement along the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and have now launched sandbox testing.
Offshore RMB (CNH) Stablecoin Case Study
Data sources: Coingecko, CoinMarketCap, Token Radar
Despite several ups and downs in the offshore market, attempts at onshore RMB (CNY) stablecoins have been largely unsuccessful. A few projects, such as LCNY and bitCNY, are essentially synthetic assets generated by collateralized crypto assets, not backed by actual fiat currency reserves. The logic behind this is clear: under China's strict foreign exchange control system, any fiat-backed stablecoin directly pegged to the onshore RMB would be tantamount to a blatant challenge to the country's core financial defenses.
Onshore RMB (CNY) Stablecoin Case Study
Data source: Defilama
These attempts, with varying degrees of success and failure, together outline the realistic picture of the development of RMB stablecoins and reveal several clear underlying laws:
1. "Offshore" is the only path; "onshore" remains a red line. All effective attempts have focused on the CNH sector, clearly indicating that for the foreseeable future, any official or semi-official projects will be strictly confined to the offshore market to ensure risk isolation from the domestic financial system.
2. Feasibility has been proven, but scaling presents a significant challenge. Technical implementation and small-scale pilots have demonstrated the ease of issuing a RMB stablecoin. However, the current market capitalization of several million dollars pales in comparison to the hundreds of billions of dollars in USD stablecoins. Finding real, large-scale application scenarios is crucial to its success.
3. The strategic focus is shifting from "globalization" to "geolocalization." If early projects still harbored a vague vision of serving the world, the launch of AnchorX in Kazakhstan signals a significant shift in strategic direction: serving specific geopolitical and economic goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, is becoming the most realistic application scenario for RMB stablecoins.
2. Opportunities and Challenges: Triple Questioning Under the Grand Narrative
Against this backdrop, the concept of a RMB stablecoin undoubtedly carries enormous strategic opportunities. Not only does it hold the potential to create a "Digital Silk Road" independent of SWIFT for Belt and Road trade, reshaping regional settlement systems, but it can also compete with the US dollar stablecoin in the global crypto economy, vying for the right to mint coins in the digital age. This is precisely the core driving force behind the government's willingness to reassess its feasibility.
However, beneath the grand narrative, three core practical issues lie before us. These are not only three "questions" that must be answered, but also key obstacles that must be cleared before the issuance of stablecoins.
The first question: How to balance monetary innovation and financial stability?
Even for offshore RMB stablecoins, capital flows will ultimately be inextricably linked to the onshore system. How to encourage innovation and expand the RMB's international influence while ensuring it doesn't become a "Trojan Horse" for capital outflows, and how to establish effective risk isolation and regulatory transparency mechanisms, these are the "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the heads of all practitioners.
The second question: How to break through the bottleneck of insufficient reserve assets?
A core contradiction lies ahead: the potential demand for RMB stablecoins is enormous, but qualified reserve assets are extremely scarce. Professor Fang Xiang of the University of Hong Kong recently quantified this issue: Based on a 2024 cross-border RMB settlement volume of 16 trillion yuan, assuming only 20% shifts to stablecoin settlement, and considering the US dollar stablecoin's currency velocity of 6.8, the required stablecoin supply would exceed 400 billion yuan. However, as of the end of 2024, the total available supply of high-quality offshore RMB short-term bonds was only tens of billions of yuan. This more than tenfold supply-demand gap represents an unavoidable bottleneck in the development of RMB stablecoins.
Data source: Financial Statistics Report of the People's Bank of China, figure is self-made by the author
The third question: How to break the monopoly of the US dollar stablecoin?
After years of development, US dollar stablecoins have established a vast global user base, deep liquidity, and a mature ecosystem. New offshore RMB stablecoins not only have to build user trust from scratch but also face formidable network effect barriers. Convincing global users and developers to switch from US dollars to RMB will be an exceptionally difficult battle.
3. “Acquiescence” and “Expedition”: The Future Roadmap of RMB Stablecoin
Regardless of whether the rumors are true or not, facing such a complex situation, it is foreseeable that the official strategy will never be a simple and crude "full liberalization", but will be a prudent and sophisticated "combination punch". Its strategic route can be roughly understood from the following three dimensions.
First, the official stance has shifted from strict prohibition to tacit approval followed by timely guidance. From the industry's "open secret" that Yiwu merchants are now widely using USDT, to the AnchorX team's recent journey to Central Asia to secure compliance licenses, these seemingly isolated incidents all point to a subtle shift in regulatory attitude: Regarding explorations that serve national strategies, the focus is shifting from strict prohibition to observation and even tacit approval. The rumored review may signal the leadership's intention to formally incorporate these "gray-gray explorations" into a more macro, controllable, top-level design.
Secondly, regarding issuance strategy, a "pretentious plank road, covert entry" strategy may emerge. Hong Kong will be the "plank road" that attracts global attention—as an officially recognized pilot, conducting limited sandbox testing. The real strategic focus, however, lies in the "Chencang" areas along the Belt and Road Initiative. Compliance teams will be encouraged to apply for licenses in friendly countries. Through a "one license, global reach" model, this will pave the way for the RMB's global expansion.
Finally, the long-term goal is to build a "new cross-border infrastructure for digital finance." Issuing a stablecoin is just the first step. The Chinese government's long-term goal remains unchanged: to establish a global cross-border payments network independent of SWIFT—it's just that the technological foundation is shifting from traditional architecture to blockchain. It's foreseeable that not only will more government-backed public chains emerge in the future, but they will also be deeply embedded in the trade network of the Belt and Road Initiative, connecting with the central banks and commercial banking systems of countries along the route. Ultimately, this will establish a highly efficient regional trade settlement ecosystem centered on the RMB, with multi-currency collaboration.
IV. Conclusion
With the issuance of a Hong Kong dollar stablecoin on the horizon and offshore RMB stablecoins already quietly being piloted in Central Asian trade scenarios, mainland China's re-examination of this sector is both natural and urgent. Whether the Reuters report is groundless or a deliberate official leak remains to be seen. However, one thing is certain: the discussion of a RMB stablecoin has moved from the background to the forefront. How the final policy will be implemented, particularly the clear demarcation between "onshore" and "offshore," will not only determine the future shape of the digital RMB but also provide a crucial window into China's strategic ambitions in the new round of global financial transformation.